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RETHINKING THE ADEQUACY OF INFORMAL
PROPERTY RULES: SOME EVIDENCE FROM
MAINE’S LOBSTER FISHERY
Avi Perry*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of fifteen years, James Acheson compiled a wealth
of information on the lobstering communities dotting the central Maine
coast from Bailey Island to Brooksville. In The Lobster Gangs of Maine,
Acheson detailed the workings and traditions of these communities,
paying particular attention to the “thick and complex web of social
relationships”1 undergirding them and to their methods of allocating
access to the lobster fishery through informal exclusion mechanisms.
Since its publication in 1988, Acheson’s study has been hailed as
documenting “a noteworthy example of long-lasting, informal property
rights in action.”2 The study has assumed a place within the body of
legal scholarship arguing that de facto property regimes can develop
organically outside of the state’s formal legal apparatus, and has been
understood to support Robert Ellickson’s hypothesis that “informal social
networks are capable of creating rules that establish property rights.”3
Within a “close-knit group,” informal property rules, such as
Acheson catalogs among Maine’s lobstermen, are believed to constrain
private behavior to the same extent as formal laws and serve to
“maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday
* Yale Law School, Class of 2010. Thanks are owed to Professors David Weisbach
and Jedediah Purdy, for their help in developing the ideas behind this Comment, and to
Captain Billy Floyd, on whose lobsterboat I spent a summer working in Casco Bay.
Special thanks to Julia as well for her support and advice.
1. JAMES ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 2 (1988) [hereinafter LOBSTER
GANGS].
2. Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 24 (2002).
3. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
203 (1991).
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affairs with one another.”4 These informal rules have been credited with
helping such groups to avoid what Garrett Hardin termed “the tragedy of
the commons”5 by creating locally-appropriate norms that are treated as
binding by members of the group.6 A number of legal scholars have
offered laudatory analyses of such informal property systems. Jonathan
Macey, for instance, has written that, where operable, “private ordering
generates substantive legal principles that are superior to those that the
state produces.”7 And, on the basis of an indigenous Cree subsistence
fishery, Fikret Berkes has concluded that “[the] ‘tragedy of the
commons’ model, with its negative prognosis, has been replaced by
theories based on the idea that resource users are capable of selforganization and self-regulation.”8
To this point, excludability has been regarded as the central
weakness of such informal systems.9 That is, the threat has been
characterized as external: outsiders who fail to understand or abide by
the common rules must be kept out, or the system must be incorporated
within a formal legal framework. However, recent developments within
Maine’s lobster fishery suggest an equally serious weakness based on an
internal threat: under unusual financial stress, members of even a closeknit group may cease to honor informal property rules, necessitating the
intervention of state enforcement mechanisms. This finding challenges
and contributes to the evolution of commons theory, suggesting that
exceptions to Hardin’s model may function only under positive
economic conditions.
My goal in this brief Comment is modest. I seek only to offer some
limited evidence to complicate the conventional understanding of
informal property regimes. I accomplish this by discussing the Maine
lobster fishery, as described by James Acheson, and showing how that

4. Id. at 167. Jonathan Macey argues that it is “repeated interactions, not the closely
knit nature of the groups, that leads to cooperation.” Jonathan R. Macey, Public and
Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1131 (1997).
5. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (1968).
Although Hardin discussed commons, today the problem is recognized as being open
access. See Fikret Berkes, Revising the Commons Paradigm, 1 J. NAT. RESOURCES POL’Y
RES. 261, 263 (2009) (“One important conclusion from post-Hardinian work is that
common property is not the same as open access, and there is nothing inherent in
commons that leads to resource degradation.”).
6. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 24.
7. Macey, supra note 4, at 1140.
8. Birkes, supra note 5, at 261.
9. See Adler, supra note 2, at 26.
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case study has reacted to economic stresses in ways largely unanticipated
by Acheson. A radical transformation is taking place in how Maine
lobstermen protect their property rights, indicating that informal property
regimes are more fragile than previously realized. Of course, a single
stone does not a castle break, and I recognize that the record remains too
thin to signal a general breakdown in informal property regimes.
Nevertheless, Acheson’s work is representative of the post-Hardinian
genre, and—as described below—both anecdotal and documentary
evidence show that his thesis is misconceived.
II. TERRITORIALITY IN THE MAINE LOBSTER FISHERY
A prefatory word about lobsters and the business of trapping them:
lobstering is a seasonal and highly variable industry. During the early
summer, when lobsters molt and seek cover in rocks and kelp beds,
lobstering is poor and catches fall precipitously.10 Late summer and
early fall is peak lobstering season, and competition among lobstermen is
fierce.11 Despite the superabundance of lobster, prices historically have
been high during peak season, reflecting the annual influx of bib-wearing
tourists into Maine.12
Built for maneuverability between traps, of which a single
lobsterman might set hundreds, lobsterboats are made of wood or
fiberglass and average between thirty-three and thirty-eight feet in
length. Traps are constructed of wood or, increasingly, wire, and are
attached to Styrofoam buoys floating on the surface by a nylon or
polypropylene rope (“warp”).13 Because lobsters tend to congregate in
shallow, coastal waters at depths of less than one hundred and fifty feet,
lobstermen rarely venture far from shore.14 In addition, because lobsters
are sedentary creatures, inhabiting a relatively circumscribed area of
ocean bottom, lobstermen always protect their territory and its quarry
vigilantly.15 Working alone or with a sternman, it is not unusual for a
lobsterman to spend his entire working life fishing the same small stretch
of ocean.
10. LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 15.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. JAMES ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE
THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY 14 (2003) [hereinafter CAPTURING THE COMMONS].
14. Id. at 15.
15. Id.; Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence
from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83-84 (1989) (arguing that informal
property norms tend to reflect the particular traits of the resource in question).
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By law, Maine’s fishing grounds are a public resource.16 Anyone
with a state-issued lobstering permit enjoys the legal right to fish nearly
anywhere along Maine’s thirty-five hundred mile coastline. Nonetheless,
newcomers to the clannish lobstering industry must abide by unwritten
rules dictating the locations where traps may be set. They either must
inherit ocean “bottom” from a family member or establish territory
through trial and error—often a costly and time-consuming process.
The territorial nature of Maine’s lobster fishery dates from at least
the 1890s and has remained unchanged along much of the coast. The
lobstermen in each cove or harbor defend their local waters from
predation by outsiders, thereby regulating access to the open ocean.17
There may be an unofficial kingpin or boss in each harbor, but decisions
about who can set traps and where often are made by committee in fish
shacks or community centers. In that sense, harbor gangs (to borrow
Acheson’s term) are both democratic and insular, with membership and
its corresponding privileges controlled tightly. Indeed, whatever the
state’s formal laws, the informal right to fish commercially for lobsters is
a closely-guarded one, neither alienable nor easily transferable. In
Acheson’s view, “the territorial system is the root institution governing
the lobster industry, making possible the generation of other kinds of rule
systems.”18
Within, but especially between harbor gangs, there is ongoing
competition among lobstermen for prime fishing territory.19 Neighboring
gangs demarcate abutting territories carefully and by reference to
specific (often underwater) markers. By and large, boundaries are taken
very seriously; “[f]ishermen who place their traps in the territory of
another gang can expect swift retribution.”20 Acheson describes the
retribution process as a covert but effective one:
The violator is usually warned, sometimes by verbal threats and
abuse, but usually by surreptitious molestation of lobstering gear.
Two half-hitches of rope may be tied around the spindle of the
buoy, or legal-sized lobsters may be taken out and the doors of
the trap left open . . . . If the violations persist, the traps are
destroyed . . . . Usually, however, the offending traps are cut off
. . . . There is no practical way to protect traps in the water . . . .
16. John Richardson, Keeping Peace on the Water Depends on Uneasy Mix of State
Law, Local Rules, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 26, 2009, at A1.
17. See LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 3.
18. CAPTURING THE COMMONS, supra note 13, at 221.
19. See LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 51-66.
20. Id. at 49.
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Destruction of traps does not usually lead to direct confrontation
since the owner can only guess who destroyed them or even
whether they were destroyed on purpose.21
While acknowledging that, “once in a while,” territorial disputes can
explode into “full-scale ‘cut war[s],’” Acheson expresses confidence that
the informal rules generally fare well and lobstermen police their own
behavior adequately.22 He writes, “the norms are widely obeyed . . . .
Victims may growl and threaten but they rarely report the incident to any
law enforcement agency.”23 Until fairly recently, Acheson’s description
held up to scrutiny.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
From the mid-1940s to the late 1980s, Maine lobster catches were
very stable, hovering around twenty million pounds annually.24 In the
1990s, the catch began to increase rapidly, totaling nearly fifty-seven
million pounds by 2000.25 By 2003, Acheson could write, “at the
present, the lobster industry is experiencing a boom. Catches have never
been so high at any period.”26 This increase is attributable to a number of
factors. First, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of traps being
set. In 1950, there were 430,000 traps set in Maine waters; by 2000,
there were 2,780,000.27 Second, technological advances have improved
the efficiency of lobstering techniques.28 Today, lobstermen regularly
make use of hydraulic trap haulers, depth finders, Loran C radio
navigation, and GPS systems. Third, there has been modest growth in
the number of licenses issued by the state. In 1950, Maine issued 5152
lobstering licenses, compared with 6884 in 2000.29 Fourth, anecdotal
evidence suggests that reporting rates may be higher today. Finally, and
most contentiously, conservation strategies implemented by federal,

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 75.
See CAPTURING THE COMMONS, supra note 13, at 16.
See id. at 16.
Id.
See id. at 17.
See id. at 18.
See id. at 16-18.
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state, and local authorities, as well as by lobstermen themselves, may
have protected the fishery from overexploitation.30
At the same time, lobster prices have slumped. Because of market
fluctuations and basic supply/demand principles, a good catch does not
always mean a good income. Particularly during an economic downturn,
consumers may “view lobsters as a luxury they can do without,” driving
prices unusually low.31 Preliminary data from the Maine Department of
Marine Resources comparing 2007 and 2008 show that the value of the
annual commercial lobster catch dropped nearly forty million dollars,
from $283,697,544 in 2007 to $244,195,068 in 2008.32 During that time,
the average price per pound declined nearly one dollar, from $4.43 to
$3.50.33 Unofficial sources confirm that the price fell even further in
2009. By midsummer, the price per pound was roughly $2.25, making
Maine lobster “less expensive than hot dogs.”34 Compounding the
economic pressure on lobstermen, the cost of diesel fuel has climbed in
recent years, and baitfish—such as herring—has doubled in price since
2007.35
What has been called “the steepest price decline in generations” is
being blamed for a recent spate of illegal activity among lobstermen.36
One Portland newspaper reported: “authorities say that desperation may
play a role in what they say has been an above-average number of
incidents of criminal mischief occurring along the coast this summer,
such as cut trap lines and vandalized boats.”37 As described above,
Maine lobstermen always have resorted to informal (and frequently

30. See, e.g., Jon Birger, Looking for a Bargain Dinner? Try Lobster, FORTUNE, July
17, 2009, available at http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/17/news/economy/cheap_lobster_
bargain.fortune/index.htm (“The size of the lobster catch is bigger than ever, thanks to
excellent oversight of the state’s lobster fishery.”).
31. Tom Bell, Plummeting Lobster Prices Dragging Coastal Economies Down,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD/ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Aug. 9, 2009, available at
http://pressherald.mainetoday.com/story.php?id=275839.
32. ME. DEP’T OF MARINE RESOURCES, HISTORICAL MAINE FISHERIES LANDING DATA
1-2 (2009), http://www.maine.gov/dmr/commercialfishing/documents/lobster.annual.
tbl.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Birger, supra note 30. See also Simmi Aujla, With Lobster Prices Low, Things
Get Ugly in Maine, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2009, at A3.
35. Birger, supra note 30.
36. Bell, supra note 31. See also Aujla, supra note 34, at A3 (“Economic pressure on
the state’s 5,000 active lobstermen may be fueling the tension. With prices for the state’s
crustaceans at the lowest level since the early 1990s, lobstermen are having trouble
covering bait, fuel, and equipment costs.”).
37. Bell, supra note 31.
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unlawful) means of protecting their territory, often through intimidation
and warnings and sometimes through equipment destruction. By all
accounts, however, the rash of violent, criminal behavior that swept
through Maine lobstering communities in the summer of 2009 was
unprecedented, prompting Major John Fetterman—a thirty-two year
veteran of the Maine Marine Patrol—to note, “this is an escalation I
haven’t seen before.”38 Aside from widespread reports of cut trap lines,
three lobsterboats in Owls Head—a small town north of Rockland—were
intentionally sunk;39 in Portland Harbor, a lobsterboat was rammed and
boarded by a rival vessel;40 and, on remote Matinicus Island, one
lobsterman shot another in the neck over a perceived territorial
incursion.41 Addressing the connection between this summer’s violence
and the economic downturn, James Acheson explained, “you’ve got an
awful lot of people on edge, stressed and anxious [now] . . . . There’s a
lot of people with very serious problems, especially younger people who
have taken out very large loans,” with lobsterboats priced around
$300,000 and a full complement of traps costing up to $40,000.42
One consequence of this uptick in criminal activity has been
increased skepticism about the long-standing territorial system
established by Maine lobstermen. The informal property regime lauded
by Acheson and others has been called into question, as lobstermen have
proven incapable of policing themselves. Predictably, the Maine Marine
Patrol has stepped-up its surveillance efforts.43 More surprisingly, there
has been a call from within the lobstering community for abandonment
of the informal territorial system in favor of state enforcement of
property rights. Local lobstermen have proposed an official Matinicus
Island lobstering zone, in which non-residents would be barred from

38. Aujla, supra note 34, at A3. See also Abigail Curtis, Man Charged with Trap
Cutting; Maine Marine Patrol Steps Up Surveillance of Midcoast Lobster Fishing,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Trap Cutting] (“Many in the
industry and the Marine Patrol said that this summer's string of violent events, which
some tie to lobster territory disputes, is the worst in recent memory.”).
39. Bell, supra note 31.
40. Clarke Canfield, Lobster Wars Rock Remote Maine Island, HUFFINGTON POST,
Sept. 5, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20090904/lobsterwars/.
41. See Aujla, supra note 34, at A3. Both the shooting and the aforementioned
sinkings occurred in Knox County, where more lobsters are caught than in any other
county in the United States. See Bell, supra note 31.
42. Abigail Curtis, Hard Times Stress-out Lobstermen, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7,
2009, at A1 [hereinafter Hard Times].
43. Trap Cutting, supra note 38, at A1.
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setting traps.44 One full-time island resident explained, “instead of us
having to enforce the boundaries, the Marine Patrol would enforce
them.”45 This demand for more formal property rules and enforcement
reflects the emergent reality that the present system of informal rules
cannot function in a poor economic climate, when desperation proves
stronger than community norms.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In writing The Lobster Gangs of Maine, Acheson plainly took aim at
Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” theory, which posited that
open-access resources will be exploited in the absence of either state
control or individual ownership.46 By touting the Maine lobster fishery’s
implementation of a successful communal property arrangement,
Acheson hoped to show that “tragedies of the commons . . . are not
inevitable” and, moreover, that “governmental action and private
property are not the only solutions to resource problems.”47 In contrast to
Hardin’s top-down approach, Acheson depicted lobstermen as able to
regulate their own industry—without government interference—through
the development of informal property rules.
The flaw in Acheson’s thesis is that it fails to appreciate the full
effects of devastating economic conditions. As demonstrated above,
lobstermen have responded to unprecedented economic stress by
violating the territorial system and abandoning informal behavioral
norms, attempting to make ends meet by capturing as much of the
resource (lobster) as possible. Frequent, serious reports of equipment
destruction, territory disputes, and violence during the summer of 2009
suggest that Acheson’s thesis only holds true in boom times, such as
those prevailing in 1988, when Acheson wrote The Lobster Gangs of
Maine, and in 2003, when he followed up with Capturing the Commons.
Acheson may have anticipated this development somewhat, but he failed
to account for either its severity or its implications:
There can be little question that the lobster industry is living in
unusually good times . . . . It is tempting to say that as long as
the existing system is maintained, all will be well . . . . However
it is all too easy to imagine changes that could bring disaster too .

44.
45.
46.
47.

See Canfield, supra note 40.
Id.
Hardin, supra note 5, at 1243.
LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 143.
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. . . Economic changes could . . . help to move the system in a
different direction.48
Increasingly, informal rules are giving way to formal rules, both on
the state’s own initiative and at the behest of lobstermen who are hoping
to avoid a “tragedy of the commons.” Although sparse, the available
evidence hints that one of the unforeseen consequences of the current
economic recession could be the collapse of informal property regimes.
The evidence points also to a similar result in the event of environmental
degradation or poor resource management: if climate change or resource
overuse threatens the stability of particular industries, informal property
systems in those industries could disintegrate. To date, those outcomes
have been staved off by boom times and effective resource management,
but—unless the economy recovers quickly—Maine’s lobster fishery
must head towards a more formalized property regime if it is to avoid a
“tragedy of the commons.” In short, post-Hardinian commons theory
may be inapplicable to bust times. While it is important to gather more
evidence to substantiate this claim, this proposed connection between the
economy and property regimes may have important implications for the
future vitality of Maine’s lobster fishery and the men and women who
depend upon it.

48. CAPTURING THE COMMONS, supra note 13, at 234.

